We study the measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) in practice with limited resource, when there are only 3 different states in implementing the decoy-state method. We present a more tightened explicit formula to estimate the lower bound of the yield of twosingle-photon pulses. Moreover, we show that the bounding of this yield and phase flip error of single photon pulse pairs can be further improved by using other constraints which can be solved by a simple and explicit program. Results of numerical simulation for key rates with both the improved explicit formula and the program are presented. It shows that the results obtained with our methods here can significantly improve the key rate and secure distance of MDI QKD with only three intensities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security for real set-ups of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] has become a major problem in the area in the recent years. The major problems here include the imperfection of source and the limited efficiency of the detection device. The decoy state method [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] can help to make a set-up with an imperfect single photon source be as secure as that with a perfect single photon source [13, 14] .
Besides the source imperfection, the limited detection is another threaten to the security [15] . Theories of the device independent security proof [16] have been proposed to overcome the problem. However, these theories cannot apply to the existing real set-ups because violation of Bell's inequality cannot be strictly demonstrated by existing set-ups.
Very recently, an idea of measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea of entanglement swapping [17, 18] . There, one can make secure QKD simply by virtual entanglement swapping, i.e., Both Alice and Bob sends BB84 states to the relay which can be controlled by un-trusted third party (UTP). After the UTP announced his measurement outcome, Alice and Bob will post select those bits corresponding to a successful event and prepared in the same basis for further processing. In the realization, Alice and Bob can really use entanglement pairs [17] and measure halves of the pair inside the lab before sending another halves to the UTP. In this way, the decoy-state method is not necessary even though imperfect entangled pairs (such as the states generated by the type II parametric down conversion) are used. Even though there are multi-pair events with small probability, these events do not affect the security. Alice and Bob only need to check the error rates of their post * Email Address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn selected bits. However, in our existing technologies, high quality entangled-pair-state generation can not be done efficiently. In the most matured technology, the generation rate is lower than 1 from 1000 pump pulses. If we want to obtain a higher key rate, we can choose to directly use an imperfect single-photon source such as the coherent state [18] . If we choose this, we must implement the decoy-state method for security. This has been discussed in Ref. [18] , and calculation formulas for the practical decoy-state implementation with only a few different states was first presented in [19] , and then further studied both experimentally [20] [21] [22] and theoretically [23? -26] . In particular, Tittel's group [20, 21] did the MDI QKD experiment with 3 intensities [19] , in the laboratory over more than 80 km of spooled fiber, as well as across different locations within the city of Calgary. By developing up-conversion single-photon detectors with high efficiency and low noise, Liu et al did it over a 50-km fiber link [22] and transmitted a 24192-image with one-time pad protocol. The pioneering experiments in Calgary [20] and in Shanghai [22] make a big step towards the final goal of real application because they clearly show the practical feasibility of MDI QKD. Sun et al [24] presented a variant formula of 3-intensity MDI QKD with numerical simulation. However, the earlier formula [19] actually behaves better than Sun et al result. Xu et al [25] studied the more general case when each sides use 3 non-vacuum states. One can see that the major formula there is identical with the one in Ref. [19] in the case when the weakest pulse is vacuum and both sides use the same 3 intensities. Qin and Wang [23] and Zhou et al [26] studied the MDI QKD with heralded single-photon sources. Curty et al studied some finite-key effects [27] .
There are two directions for the future study of the MDI QKD. One is to improve the experimental techniques, so as to improve the robustness and efficiency. The other is to upgrade the theoretical results so as to obtain a higher key rate given the same experimental data.
Here in this work, we shall first give better explicit formulas of 3-state decoy-state method for the MDI-QKD . We then estimate the infimum of yield and the supremum of error rate single-photon pulse pairs to the UTP with a simple and efficient program. In the fifth section, we present the numerical simulations. The article is ended with a concluding remark.
II. DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH ONLY 3 STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is controlled by an UTP. The UTP will announce whether the pulse-pair has caused a successful event. Those bits corresponding to successful events will be post-selected and further processed for the final key. Since real setups only use imperfect single-photon sources, we need the decoy-state method for security.
We assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, o A , x A , y A (o B , x B , y B ) which can only emit three different states ρ oA = |0 0|, ρ xA , ρ yA (ρ oB = |0 0|, ρ xB , ρ yB ), respectively, in photon number space. Suppose
and we request the states satisfy the following very important condition:
for k ≥ 2. The imperfect sources used in practice such as the coherent state source, the heralded source out of the parametric-down conversion, satisfy the above restriction. Given a specific type of source, the above listed different states have different averaged photon numbers (intensities), therefore the states can be obtained by controlling the light intensities. At each time, Alice will randomly select one of her 3 sources to emit a pulse, and so does Bob. The pulse form Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and are sent to the un-trusted relay. We regard equivalently that each time a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse pair (one pulse from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emitted. There are many different two-pulse sources used in the protocol. We denote αβ for the two pulse source when the pulse-pair is produced by source α at Alice's side and source β at Bob's side, α can be one of {o A , x A , y A } and β can be one of {o B , x B , y B }. For example, at a certain time j Alice uses source o A and Bob uses source y B , we say the pulse pair is emitted by source o A y B . In the protocol, two different bases, Z basis consisting of horizontal polarization |H H| and vertical polarization |V V |, and X basis consisting of π/4 and 3π/4 polarizations are used. The density operator in photon number space alone does not describe the state in the composite space. We shall apply the the decoy-state method analysis in the same basis (e.g., Z basis or X basis) for pulses from sources x A , x B , y A , y B . Therefore we only need consider the density operators in the photon number space. For simplicity, we consider pulses from source prepared in Z basis first.
According to the decoy-state theory, the yield of a certain set of pulse pairs is defined as the happening rate of a successful event (announced by the UTP) corresponding to pulse pairs out of the set. Mathematically, the yield is n/N where n is the number of successful events happened corresponding to pulse pairs from the set and N is the number of pulse pairs in the set. Obviously, if we regard the pulse pairs of two-pulse source αβ as a set, the yield S αβ for source αβ is S αβ = n αβ N αβ , where n αβ is the number of successful events happened corresponding to pulse pairs from source αβ and N αβ is the number of times source αβ are used. In the protocol, there are 9 different two-pulse sources. The yields of these 9 sources can be directly calculated from the observed experimental data n αβ and N αβ . We use capital letter S αβ for these known values.
We can regard any source as a composite source that consists of many (virtual) sub-sources, if the source state can be be written in a convex form of different density operators. For example, two-pulse source y A y B includes a sub-source of pulse pairs of state ρ 1 ⊗ ρ 1 (ρ 1 = |1 1|) with weight a
. This is to say, after we have used source y A y B for N times, we have actually used sub-source of state ρ 1 ⊗ ρ 1 for a ′ 1 b ′ 1 N times, asymptotically. Similarly, the source x A x B also includes a sub-source of state ρ 1 ⊗ρ 1 with weight a 1 b 1 . These two sub-sources of state ρ 1 ⊗ ρ 1 must have the same yield s 11 because they have the same two-pulse state and the pulse pairs are randomly mixed. Most generally, denote s, s ′ as the yields of two sets of pulses, if pulse pairs of these two sets are randomly mixed and all pulses have the same density operator, then
asymptotically. This is the elementary assumption of the decoy-state theory.
In the protocol, since each sources are randomly chosen, pulses from each sub-sources or sources are also randomly mixed. Therefore, the yield of a sub-source or a source is dependent on the state only, it is independent of which physical source the pulses are from. Therefore, we can also define the yield of a certain state: whenever a pulse pair of that state is emitted, the probability that a successful event happens. Denote
for a two-pulse state. The yield of such a state is also the yield of any source which produces state Ω αβ only, or the yield of a sub-source from any source, provided that the state of the pulse pairs of the sub-source is Ω αβ .
Note that, we don't always know the value of yield of a state. Because we don't know which sub-source was used at which time. We shall use the lower case symbol s α,β to denote the yield of state Ω α,β . In general, the yields of a sub-source (a state), such as s 11 is not directly known from the experimental data. But some of them can be deduced from the yields of different real sources. Define ρ 0 = |0 0|. According to Eq.(4), if α ∈ {0, x A , y A } and β ∈ {0, x B , y B }, we have 
This equation is simply the fact that the total number of successful events caused by pulses from a certain set is equal to the summation of the numbers of successful events caused by pulses from each sub-sets. Consider the convex forms of source x A x B , x A y B , y A x B and source y A y B . Without causing any ambiguity, we omit the subscripts A and B in the following of this paper. Explicitly,
and
In order to get a lower bound of s 11 , we should derive the expression of s 11 with Eqs.(8-11) firstly. Combining Eqs. (8) (9) (10) , we obtain the expression of s 11 by eliminating s 12 and s 21 such that
where
In these expressions, we use the superscript * (123) to denote the result obtained with the first three equations from Eqs. (8) (9) (10) (11) . Under the conditions presented in Eq.(3), we can easily find out that (a 1 a
Now we only consider Eq. (8) and Eq. (11) . By eliminating s 12 or s 21 respectively, we get two expressions of s 11 such that
For any sources used in the protocol, we must have either
Suppose the former one holds, we can easily find out that f
is a lower bound of s 11 . On the other hand, if
is a lower bound of s 11 . Considering the following two relations
we know that K a − K b and f
have the same sign which means that they are both positive or negative simultaneously. Then we can write the lower bound of s 11 with Eq.(8) and Eq.(11) into the following compact form s (14) 11 = min{s
that is the result presented in Ref. [19] . In the coming, we will prove that the lower bound s
given in Eq.(17) is more tightly than s (14) 11 . Firstly, if we suppose K a ≤ K b holds, then we know that a
. For any (m, n) ∈ J 1 we have
We can easily know that s 
(m, n) ≤ 0 for all (m, n) ∈ J 1 within the same way. Then we get s
In the last part of this section, we will derive another lower bound of s 11 with those four Eqs. (8) (9) (10) (11) . The idea presented in Refs. [19, 24] inspire us to do the following deductioñ
where we have used the condition presented in Eq. (3), and α = min{A, B, C} with
Actually, under the condition in Eq.(3), we know that
Then α can be written as α = min{A, B}. According to the relation presented in Eq.(37), we obtain the other expression of s 11
With the condition presented in Eq.(3), we can easily prove that f
11 is the other lower bound of s 11 . In the coming, we will discuss the relation among s . Firstly, we consider the special case with a k = b k and a
11 (m, n)
for any (m, n) ∈ J 2 . Then we know that s
11 ≥ s
11 in this case.
Secondly, for the general case, we can prove that
In the situation with A ≤ B, we have
With this condition, we can do the following calculation
On the other hand, in the situation with A ≥ B, we have
Summing up the results presented in Eq.(42) and Eq.(43), we complete the proof of Eq.(41). In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need the upper bound of error rate caused by the two singlephoton pulses, say e 11 . Similar to the total gain, the total error rate with source αβ chosen by Alice and Bob can be written as [18] 
and 
In the protocol, there are two different bases. We denote s Z 11 and s X 11 for yields of single-photon pulse pairs in the Z and X bases, respectively. Consider those postselected bits cased by source x A x B in the Z basis. After an error test, we know the bit-flip error rate of this set, say
We also need the phase-flip rate for the subset of bits which are caused by the two single-photon pulse, say e ph 11 , which is equal to the flip rate of post-selected bits caused by a single photon in the X basis, say e X 11 . Given this, we can now calculate the key rate by the well-know formula. For example, for those post-selected bits caused by source y A y B , it is
where f is the efficiency factor of the error correction method used.
III. EXACT MINIMUM OF YIELD WITH ONLY 3 STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In the previous section, we show the lower bound of yield s 11 and the upper bound of error rate e 11 with explicit formulas. The lower bound s 11 . Keeping sight of this fact, we suspect that a more tightly bound can be found out with considering all relations given by Eqs.(8-11) (or Eqs. (44-47) ). In the rest of this section, we will present an explicit algorithm within a finite number of steps to get an exact minimum of yield s 11 . An an exact maximum of error rate e 11 will be given in the next section. 
According to Eqs.(8-11), we can find out the expression
, and
.
(61)
In the following, we denote the superscript (1234) by ( * ) for short. In order to estimate the lower bound of s 11 , we need present some properties about the functions f
22 (m, n). With the condition given by Eq.(3), we know that f 22 ≥ 0, the problem can be solved by taking s mn = 1 for all (m, n) ∈ J 3 . But in practice, this trivial situation never or almost never occur.
Generally, we can not solve this COP problem analytically. In what follows we will show that the problem can be solved by explicit algorithm. Still, as shown below, it can always be determined within a finite number of steps.
A. Definition of the lower bound
In order to solve this COP problem presented in Eq. (62), we need analysis the ratio
Under the condition in Eq.(3), we can easily prove that h a (k), h b (k) are two nonnegative monotone increasing functions of variable k ≥ 3. This fact tells that s m+1,n and s m,n+1 have priority to be equal to 1 over s mn in order to minimize s 11 in Eq.(62). Back to the COP problem, we can solve it by introducing the following three subsets J L , J s = {(m s , n s )}, J U of J 3 and one positive real number s L ∈ (0, 1] such that
Then we can define the lower bound of s 11 by
With the definitions of J L , J s , J U given by Eqs.(65-68), we know that the set J 3 is decomposed into three subsets J L , J s , J U . It's important to point out that the subsets J L , J s , J U need not be unique but the lower bound s * 11
given by Eq.(69) is always uniquely determined. If the subsets J L , J s , J U have two different choices which are denoted by J L1 , J s1 , J U1 and J L1 , J s1 , J U1 , then we must have
11 (m s1 , n s1 ) = h (22) 11 (m s2 , n s2 ) = h (22) 11 ((m, n) ∈ J U12 ),
and the number of elements in the two sets J L1 , J L2 are the same, the number of elements in the two sets J U1 , J U2 are also the same. In Eq.(70), J L12 = (J L1 −J L2 )∪(J L2 − J L1 ) contains the elements that only included in J L1 or only in J L2 and J U12 = (J U1 − J U2 ) ∪ (J U2 − J U1 ) contains the elements that only included in J U1 or only in J U2 . Here and after in this article, we use A − B to denote the set which contains the elements in A but not in B. So we get s L1 = s L2 and
With this fact, we can conclude that the lower bound s * 11
given by Eq. (69) is uniquely.
B. An algorithm for finding JL, Js, JU and sL
In order to confirm the value of s * 11 , we need to determine the elements in sets J L , J s , J U and the proper value of s L . In the following, we will present an algorithm for finding it within finite steps.
Though we have known that h
11 (m + 1, n) ≥ h (22) 11 (m, n) and h (22) 11 (m, n + 1) ≥ h (22) 11 (m, n) for any (m, n) ∈ J 3 . But we can not pick the larger one between h (22) 11 (m + 1, n) and h (22) 11 (m, n + 1) unless we preset the sources used by Alice and Bob. Fortunately, this defects does not affect us to derive the algorithm within finite steps.
In order to describe the algorithm clearly, we need to do the following preparations. Firstly, we define two limitsĥ
where h a (m) and h b (n) are defined in Eq.(64). As discussed before, we know that h a (k), h b (k) are two nonnegative monotone increasing functions of k ≥ 3. Furthermore, under the condition in Eq.(3), we can also prove that h a (a The functions h a (k) is nonnegative monotone increasing function with finite upper bound which means that the limitations of it must be exist. And the same for h b (k). This complete the proof of Eq.(72). Explicitly, if Alice and Bob send out coherent pulses, we haveĥ a = (a
Secondly, we also need the notations
Considering the normalizing conditions
we can calculate F c (m 0 , n 0 ), F r (m 0 , n 0 ) by the following explicit formulas
. Furthermore, for given J L , J s and J U we introduce a vector V s with l s elements and two natural number m J , n J such that
The number l s is defined by
The k-th element of V s can be defined by
Actually, with given the vector V s , we know that J s = {(m s , n s )} can only be one element chosen from the following set
WithĴ s , we define three sets which contain only one element in each of them as follows
11 (m, n)}, (82)
11 (m, n)},(83)
11 (m, n)},(84)
Finally, for given J s and J U , we define
With these preparations, we are ready to present the algorithm as follows.
Algorithm.
Step1. Initially, we have (3, 3) , else if J s = {(3, 2)}, V s = (4, 2) and m J = n J = 2. Calculate G s using Eq.(86). Actually, with J L = ∅, G s can be calculated by the following explicit formula
As discussed before, we suppose G ′ = G(L 3 ) < 0 initially. After these preparations, we initialize G f with G f = G(J U ) according to Eq.(85). If G f < 0 we goto Step2, else we goto Step3.
Step2.
22 (m, n), whereĴ s is defined in Eq.(81). So we need to find out the setF s . Firstly, we check that the following two inequalities fulfilled or not,
where 
11 ((m, n) ∈ K r ) is greater than all the values h
We need to calculate the value
22 ((m, n) ∈ J s ). If G f < 0, we go back to step2, else we goto Step3. On the other hand, if G ′ (J U ) > 0, then we know that the element in the final set of J s must be included in J r . In this case we need
we go back to step2, else we goto Step3.
Step2.2. In this situation, we know that h (22) 11 ((m, n) ∈ K c ) is greater than all the values h (22) 11 (k, n J ) for all k ≥ 2. We need to calculate the value
Then we can calculate the lower bound s * 11 of s 11 by using Eq.(69).
IV. EXACT MAXIMUM ERROR RATE WITH ONLY 3 STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In section 2, we show the upper bound of error rate e 11 with explicit formula. The upper bound of e is obtained with Eq.(44) by setting e mn = 0, where (m, n) ∈ J 2 . Obviously, the condition with source y A and y B does not used in deriving e (1) 11 . Keeping sight of this fact, we suspect that a more tightly bound can be found out with considering all relations given by Eqs.(44-47). In the rest of this section, we will present that we can find out an exact maximum of error rate e 11 within a finite number steps.
According to Eqs.(44-47), we can find out the expres- [5, 18, 24] :
where ξ k is the transmittance for a distance from Alice to the UTB. For fair comparison, we use the same parameter values used in [18, 24] for our numerical evaluation, which follow the experiment reported in [28] . For simplicity, we shall put the detection efficiency to the overall transmittance η = ξ 2 ζ. We assume all detectors have the same detection efficiency ζ and dark count rate p d . The values of these parameters are presented in Table I . With this, the total gains S ω µi,νj , (ω = X, Z) and error rates S ω µi,νj E ω µi,νj , (ω = X, Z) of Alice's intensity µ i (i = 0, 1, 2) and Bob's intensity ν j (j = 0, 1, 2) can be calculated. By using these values, we can estimate the lower bounds of yield s with Eq.(52) and Eq.(103). The estimated parameters of s 11 and e 11 are shown in Fig.1 and Fig.3 , respectively, which clearly shows that our methods are more tightly than the pre-existed results. In order to see more clearly, in Fig.2 , we plot the relative value of s 11 to the result obtained with the infinite decoy-state method. We can observe that our results are more close to the asymptotic limit of the infinite decoy-state method than the pre-existed results. Moreover, we can find out that the results given by the numerical method are more tightly than the analytical method. Furthermore, with these parameters, we can estimate the final key rate R of this protocol with Eq.(53) which is shown in Fig.4 . In these four figures, the blue dotted line is obtained by the method presented in Ref. [24] , the green dash-dot line is obtained by the method presented in Ref. [19] , the red dashed line is obtained by the analytical method presented in section 2 with Eq. (19) and Eq.(52), the black solid line is obtained by the numerical method presented in section 3 with Eq.(69) and Eq.(103) and the magenta solid line is the result obtained by the infinite decoy-state method. In the simulation, the densities used by Alice and Bob are assigned to µ 1 = ν 1 = 0.1, µ 2 = ν 2 = 0.5.
Furthermore, if we fix the densities of the decoy-state pulses used by Alice and Bob, the final key rate will change with Alice and Bob taking different densities for their single-state pulses. Here, we also take µ 1 = ν 1 = 0.1 and assume that µ 2 = ν 2 > µ 1 . In Fig.5 , we present the the optimal key rates with different methods. In order to see more clearly, in Fig.6 , we plot the relative value of the optimal key rate to the result obtained with the infinite decoy-state method. We can observe that our results are better than the pre-existed results. The optimal densities with the optimal key rate versus the total channel transmission loss is given in Fig.7 .
VI. CONCLUSION
We study the MDI-QKD in practice with only 3 different states in implementing the decoy-state method. Firstly, we present a more tightly analytical formulas for the decoy-state method for two-pulse sources with 3 different states. Then we show an exact maximum of the yield s 11 and an exact minimum of the error rate e 11 with an efficient algorithm. These methods can be applied to the recently proposed MDI-QKD with imperfect singlephoton source such as the coherent states or the heralded states from the parametric down conversion. Finally, we give some numerical simulations. The results show that our methods are better than the pre-existing results.
